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Policy Points 
• Tobacco industry denormalization is a key strategy for tobacco control that has been formalized in 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 
• International trade and investment laws are a potential threat to tobacco industry denormalization 
because they do not automatically incorporate denormalization and, in theory, treat tobacco firms 
like other commercial interests. 
• Countries that seek to defend tobacco control policies against international trade and investment 
challenges need to have good governance in two senses: good governance as understood by 
tribunals and good-enough governance to manage the processes and requirements that enable 
policies to survive international challenges. 
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Context: Tobacco industry denormalization (TID), portraying tobacco product manufacturers as a 
deadly industry, is a major strategy for public health advocates. Using this strategy, activists around 
the world have successfully pushed for governments to enact tobacco control regulations, including 
the unprecedented international Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). TID has been a 
distinctive legal and political strategy that has affected the place of tobacco in law and has both 
inspired and constrained those who would imitate the strategy in other areas of regulation, such as 
diet or alcohol. It is therefore a case study in the creation of a distinctive legal approach and of 
threats to that approach from the changing role of world trade and investment law, which creates a 
new set of venues that tobacco industry advocates can use to redefine tobacco as a normal good 
and to seek out “fair and equitable treatment” for their industry. 
 
Methods: We review legal and policy documents pertaining to two major challenges to tobacco 
control policies in Australia and Uruguay aimed at controlling industry branding. 
 
Findings: International trade and investment law challenges TID and raises fundamental questions 
about the role of the state in protecting public health. Recent trade disputes involving Uruguay and 
Australia illustrate this dynamic. Despite losing high-court challenges against packaging regulations 
in both countries, tobacco firms were still able to challenge states in a different way, through 
international trade and investment agreements. This article identifies the industry’s strategies and 
the responses of those seeking to avoid renormalizing tobacco as a part of world trade. In particular, 
states must demonstrate that their tobacco control policies satisfy standards set by tribunals, which 
include standards of good governance, and they must prepare their policies in a way that reduces 
legal risk and requires good governance. 
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Conclusions: Although TID has strengthened the hand of tobacco control advocates, TID strategies 
alone are not sufficient to defend public regulations against extraterritorial legal challenges in an 
arena that resists the basic TID technique of singling out a particular industry. Public health 
advocates might also note the FCTC’s aid in helping governments defend themselves against these 
challenges and consider similar international instruments for other areas. 
 
Keywords: governance, tobacco control, trade, investment. 
Tobacco control regulations are often the focus of intense and polarized political conflict. On one 
side of the conflict is an international community of public health researchers and advocates. 
Tobacco control advocates share principled beliefs about protecting and maintaining public health, 
professional judgment about the causal relationships between tobacco use and poor health, 
common notions of validating that knowledge, and a common policy enterprise. Leveraging scientific 
evidence and public opinion, they push for tight regulation of tobacco products and the industry that 
makes them. 
 Opposing them are tobacco firms and their allies, which are highly globalized, well 
resourced, and dominated by a handful of large companies. Despite commercial success and strong 
revenues, tobacco companies have lost a number of important political battles since the late 1990s, 
resulting in a sullied public reputation and, in many countries, regulatory constraints on lobbying 
activities. Likewise, the stakes are high for tobacco control advocates who risk losing ground unless 
they consistently renew their antismoking message. 
 In such a polarized political environment, each side has a dominant political strategy. 
Tobacco control advocates seek to link scientific evidence and subject matter expertise with public 
opinion, constructing a narrative that not only focuses on the individual and population health 
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consequences of smoking but also targets the behavior of the tobacco industry and its contribution 
to the smoking epidemic. This “denormalization” narrative, encoded in the international Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, portrays tobacco companies’ behavior as aberrant, an abnormal, 
rather than a normal, part of society and economy. Advocates point out that in addition to suffering 
from the consequences of addiction to a harmful product, smokers are victims of tobacco industry 
tactics and misrepresentation of the facts.1 
 Denormalization of tobacco industry behavior is beneficial to tobacco control advocates 
because it changes the culture of smoking at the population level. Public opinion research shows 
that a poor opinion of the tobacco industry contributes to the decision of some people to not start 
smoking and strengthens the intent of others to quit.2 Through years of media campaigns, public 
education, litigation, and advocacy strategies that emphasize evidence of the industry’s duplicity and 
corruption, public health activists have substantially convinced mainstream audiences that both 
cigarettes and cigarette manufacturers are serious health hazards.3-6 Successful denormalization 
then affects politics, shaping public opinion in ways helpful to tobacco control. It also works to 
convince elites that tobacco companies are not normal and legitimate participants in policymaking. 
 Drawing evidence from two recently concluded international investment disputes that 
challenged domestic tobacco control regulations, this article evaluates the success of tobacco 
industry denormalization (TID) arguments against industry efforts to seek out “fair and equitable 
treatment” through trade and investment forums. To what extent do TID strategies support states in 
defending against investment claims? 
 In response to the strategy of public health advocates, the tobacco industry has sought to 
move debates into forums where denormalization has not taken place and where their product and 
business are consequently not seen as aberrant. The global industry has taken advantage of its 
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ability to act in coordinated ways across state borders by fighting in some countries’ domestic courts 
but not others, by focusing its lobbying on countries with weaker governance, and by seeking 
favorable decisions in legal forums that go beyond domestic courts, such as international arbitration 
panels and multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms. These forums are often less transparent and 
less democratic, marginalize principles of public law, and include public policies only against a 
background of rules designed to promote or protect private firms. By moving to forums with more 
restricted access, the industry can deflect political criticism and public scrutiny of their actions, 
seeking to defeat the tools and advocates of denormalization by working in an area where those 
tools and advocates are weak or excluded. Analysis of the cases shows that even despite the 
denormalizing work of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, an international agreement 
that codifies TID strategies, upholding claims of industry wrongdoing requires both documentation 
of governance procedures and a willingness of investment tribunals to defer to states regarding the 
use of their regulatory authority. 
 It is important to ask questions about the future of TID strategies at this time in the history 
of public health. In the current climate, the perceived power of industry denormalization strategies 
is such that public health advocates are adapting them to other areas. Researchers are seeking to 
document activities of the alcohol and food industries and are framing tobacco industry actions as 
one case within a broader argument against commercial interests.7 Influential environmentalists are 
constructing arguments against the producers of fossil fuels, trying to denormalize the behavior of 
firms like Exxon as well as projects like the US-Canada Keystone XL Pipeline.8 It remains to be seen, 
though, how well TID strategies will stand up in areas where the body of evidence documenting 
harm by industries or their products is less comprehensive or where the political consensus behind 
the need for action is less well established, including in tobacco control areas such as e-cigarette 
regulation. 
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 Public health advocates face a set of strategic decisions regarding how far to pursue TID. 
Before returning to this strategic dilemma, the following sections define TID and explain its role in 
the FCTC, and then analyze how TID strategies held up in investment disputes brought against 
Uruguay and Australia. 
 
Tobacco Industry Denormalization: A Distinct Political and Legal Strategy 
 
The cigarette is the deadliest object in the history of human civilization . . . cigarettes are the 
only legal products that are deadly when used as intended by the manufacturer.9 
 
“Denormalization” portrays an action, person, or organization as aberrant, deviant, or abnormal. 
Once an actor or action is denormalized, normal status and protections may no longer be available. 
Smokers can be asked to smoke outdoors, and industry can be excluded from participating in its own 
regulation. 
 From the 1990s onward, a shift in the tobacco control discourse, sparked by the growing 
public awareness of the duplicity of tobacco firm representatives, led to the greater prevalence of 
denormalization strategies that emphasized industry practices rather than the actions of individual 
smokers.10 Although tobacco control advocates began in the 1950s to systematically raise concerns 
about the harms of smoking, their success in achieving policy change was limited by the government 
treatment of tobacco firms as important commercial interests. The belated acknowledgment by 
some tobacco companies in the 1990s that cigarettes were addictive was a watershed because it 
allowed TID strategies to be built and strengthened.11-12 This change in discourse, combined with 
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greater access to internal industry documents as the result of successful litigation, formed a 
foundation for policies targeting the industry, including required health warnings, mandated imagery 
and plain packaging (extensive regulatory control over the packaging of tobacco products in order to 
minimize the effects of branding), bans on promotions and advertising, requirements to disclose 
certain behaviors, limitations on contacts between government officials and the industry, public 
inquiries, government litigation against the industry, and counter industry marketing campaigns. 
 At the heart of all these policies is the idea that the tobacco industry is outside the realm of 
ordinary regulated capitalism, that it is engaged in activities that society should consider as 
illegitimate. This process is tobacco industry denormalization (TID): the act of framing the actions of 
the tobacco industry as outside acceptable societal norms. TID as an explicit political strategy 
involves increasing scrutiny of industry behavior, publicizing poor behavior by the industry, building 
a narrative of exceptionalism around tobacco products, and stigmatizing tobacco firms, including 
limiting contact between firms and political decision makers. 
 In Canada, where TID was adopted in 1999 as a key part of its national strategy to reduce 
tobacco use, TID was defined as activities designed to “reposition tobacco products and the tobacco 
industry consistent with the addictive and hazardous nature of tobacco products, the health, social 
and economic burden resulting from the use of tobacco, and the practices undertaken by the 
industry to promote its products and create social goodwill toward the industry.”13 Public health 
researchers and advocates have emphasized the links between the tobacco industry and organized 
crime, the industry’s promotion of smoking to children and youth, its attempts to interfere with 
tobacco taxation and smoking-reduction programs, and its connections with the retail, hospitality, 
and film industries.12,14-22 
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 In other words, TID approaches argue that tobacco products should be treated 
similarly to heroin or atomic weapons, that is, not something that firms are allowed to 
produce or sell on the open market.
23-24
 Today, public health advocates and sympathetic 
policymakers do not talk about tobacco companies in the same way that they talk about 
BASF or Ford Motors. They may criticize nontobacco companies’ public health records, but 
they do not argue that their industries should be shut down. By contrast, tobacco control 
advocates have frequent discussions about the tobacco “end game,” how to rapidly decrease 
the number of smokers to the point that the industry becomes obsolete.
25-26
 
 
Industry Normalization Strategies: Seeking “Fair and Equitable Treatment” 
TID has been used in politics and policy to good effect, which means that tobacco firms have resisted 
it in every way they can. In response to TID strategies, tobacco companies have used trade and 
investment law to challenge states’ tobacco control policies; threatening, and eventually initiating, 
investment disputes against Australia and Uruguay; and sponsoring disputes through the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). This strategy involves two actions: constructing an alternative frame that 
presents the tobacco industry and its products as legitimate and seeking out new forums thorough 
which it can promote and strengthen this frame. Firms argue that tobacco products are “legal 
goods” that are traded in line with national and international rules that govern markets. They 
leverage their considerable resources to both “forum-shop,” choosing the world’s best forums in 
which to make their case, and to “buy in bulk,” or simultaneously launching multiple challenges to 
tobacco control law.27 As many jurisdictions become less friendly to the industry, firms seek venues 
where they are regarded as a normal and appropriate participants. 
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 Trade and investment agreements provide important opportunities for companies seeking 
redress for specific government actions that they consider unfair or arbitrary. Bilateral Investment 
Agreements (BITs), international investment agreements (such as the Energy Charter), and some 
international trade agreements (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA) 
contain provisions that allow foreign investors to challenge government actions that affect their 
investments through ad hoc, extraterritorial legal tribunals. Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
mechanisms, as they are called, usually provide for a panel of three arbitrators, usually highly elite 
lawyers, to assess the case and award damages. The number of ISDS cases globally has been on an 
upward trend in recent years as more and more firms pursue arbitration to challenge domestic 
regulations.28 As a result, ISDS has moved from relative obscurity to the forefront of political 
disputes over national sovereignty in a world of global markets, the place of public law outside 
national territories, and the future of socially minded regulation. 
 In adopting a strategy of pursuing international trade and investment arbitration, tobacco 
firms are relying on the fact that global trade and investment spaces will exclude or minimize public 
health norms and prioritize private business over the principles of public law.27 In other words, 
industry forum-shopping unsurprisingly leads it to trade and investment forums focused on business 
interests. 
 Tobacco companies have been invoking trade and investment policies in their lobbying 
strategies since the early 1990s. In 1995, they threatened to sue Canada under the NAFTA dispute 
settlement mechanism and thereby blocked federal plain-packaging proposals.29-30 In 1995, the 
Australian Ministry for Human Services and Health declined to move forward on plain packaging on 
the grounds that it would violate the Australian constitution, claiming that the policy would require 
Australia to purchase the trademarks owned by tobacco firms.29-32 Although an investment dispute 
might cause a government to compensate a firm, ran the argument, this would not automatically 
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cause policy change, and there is no circumstance in which a state would have to “buy” a trademark. 
These examples, therefore, show the climate of uncertainty surrounding the application of trade and 
investment law and the ability of industry to use uncertainty to its advantage. 
 Since these early cases, it has become common for industry representatives to claim that 
tobacco control regulations violate trade, investment, and intellectual property commitments made 
by states in international treaties, and for industry communications to ominously declare that they 
would not hesitate to seek legal redress using trade forums should the measures in question be 
passed.27 Investigations using publicly disclosed internal industry documents show that tobacco 
firms make these claims even when they have received legal advice to the contrary .33 
 But until 2010, despite a long history of litigious behavior, the tobacco industry had not 
specifically acted on these threats. Since that time, however, the industry has both directly 
participated in investor-state disputes and indirectly influenced (and financed) state-to-state 
disputes, with the intention of challenging national tobacco control regulations. The state-to-state 
disputes, via the WTO, are still to be officially decided, despite a ruling in favor of Australia by a WTO 
panel in June 2018. Honduras and the Dominican Republic chose to appeal the decision, and the 
appeal is ongoing. Accordingly, the following sections in this article focus on the two disputes that 
have been formally concluded. 
 There is no one single set of rules by which international investment disputes are managed 
but, rather, several competing regimes, of which the most prominent are those governed by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Regardless of which system is used, the parties to the 
dispute have a great deal of discretion in deciding how disputes will proceed. Beyond placing private 
investors on a level (or, some may say, commercially biased) playing field with state governments, 
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the conduct of investor-state arbitration has been heavily criticized on several grounds, including but 
not limited to a lack of transparency and access, the ad hoc nature of arbitration tribunals and lack 
of formal precedent, and the cost of and expertise required to defend disputes. Not all arbitration 
decisions are in the public domain, and even when they are, some information is redacted. 
Transcripts of the arguments presented are not available, with panels deciding on an ad hoc basis 
which information to release. Tribunals also decide who can and cannot submit amicus curiae briefs, 
which can be vital sources of evidence in public interest cases. 
 Unlike most domestic courts, tribunal members are appointed to serve on a case-by-case 
basis. Although individual tribunal members are repeat players who can be appointed to future 
tribunals, the tribunals themselves are one-shot players. Established courts are often concerned 
about their long-term legitimacy and power and tailor their decisions accordingly, but ad hoc 
tribunals might not have the same incentives to promote the long-term legitimacy of the trading 
system.34 Although tribunals frequently refer to previous decisions, there is no formal deference to 
precedent, the result being a lack of consensus across decisions. Tribunals continue to differ 
substantially over how some of the core principles of investment agreements should be interpreted. 
Investment agreements are not standardized either. BITs, of which there are around 3,000 globally, 
are worded very differently depending on when and where they were negotiated, thus allowing 
considerable latitude in interpretation. 
 Settling investment disputes is very expensive for governments, often costing millions of 
dollars. Although this may not be an obstacle for resource-rich states, many disputes are initiated 
against developing and middle-income countries that cannot afford to fight them without 
considerable outside help. Depending on the panel, the costs of the case and the names of the 
outside interests contributing to the case may not be disclosed. 
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 The flexibility of international investment arbitration and the benefits that it confers on 
private interests are illustrated in the two cases discussed next, particularly with regard to the 
evidence submitted to the tribunal, the transparency of proceedings, and the extent to which the 
tribunals considered prior cases.35 In the Uruguay case, the tribunal made ad hoc decisions about 
whether or not to allow and consider amicus briefs. With one eye on the public significance of the 
case, the tribunal granted the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO) the ability to file amicus curiae briefs, stating that “in view of the public interest 
involved in this case, granting the Request would support the transparency of the proceeding and its 
acceptability by users at large.”36 Both briefs stressed the public health evidence base underlying the 
challenged policies, and they proved to be very important influences on the tribunal’s reasoning. 
Applications from other groups, Avaaz (an online activist network) and the Asociación 
Interamericana de la Propiedad Intelectual (ASIPI), were denied. The tribunal did not accept Avaaz’s 
argument that it had a “unique membership” and considered ASIPI to have too close a relationship 
with the claimants to be objective.36 This is significant in that intellectual property peak associations 
have been strong allies for the tobacco industry regarding lobbying activities and domestic court 
cases, and they have formed a particularly strong epistemic network of their own in parts of Latin 
America.37 
 In the Australia case, the parties disagreed over the level of secrecy to be adopted in the 
proceedings. From the start, Australia argued that in a case like this, engaging with the public 
interest should have a high level of transparency. Eventually the parties agreed that some 
information could be released, although the resulting documents are missing certain redacted 
information, largely about the business dealings of, and legal advice received by, the tobacco firms. 
Information about the costs of the dispute has also not been released. This negotiated transparency 
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is important because it means that third parties have less chance than they would in a domestic 
court to influence, or learn from, the proceedings. 
 Finally, the degree to which the tribunals referred to previous cases is important, as 
international investment arbitration has no formal system of precedent. In both cases, the tribunals 
extensively referenced previous decisions in order to set the boundaries for the legal tests they 
would apply. While this is not unusual in international arbitration cases, despite the lack of a formal 
precedent requirement, the extent to which the arbitrators reference prior cases is indicative of the 
relative importance of these cases in investment law. 
 
The FCTC: Tobacco Industry Denormalization in International Law 
 
There is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry's interests 
and public health policy interests. FCTC Article 5.3, Guidelines, 2008, Principle 1.38 
 
Tobacco control advocates are well aware that international trade and investment law, with its focus 
on defending firms, is a potentially hostile environment for regulation and TID strategies. Therefore, 
to preserve and extend domestic gains for TID strategies, they require an international TID strategy. 
Key to that strategy is an international instrument, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC). 
 The FCTC is in many ways an unusual international agreement in that it is binding on those 
countries that have ratified it, committing them to implementing successively stricter tobacco 
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control policies. The list of 180 countries (plus the European Commission) that have ratified the FCTC 
does not include the United States, which signed it but never ratified it, or some other states such as 
Indonesia and Argentina. But despite patchy implementation, it is one of the most endorsed 
international agreements. And it is a rare, perhaps unique, example of governments using an 
international agreement to bind themselves against interacting with an industry that operates freely 
and legally in their national economies. That it targets industry and not just the products it makes is 
significant. 
 The FCTC is built on TID arguments. The convention and its related guidelines explicitly 
attack the tobacco industry for its history of undesirable “interference” in democratic policymaking, 
and they commit government officials to maintaining distance between themselves and industry 
representatives. Much of what would be called ordinary lobbying in a normal context becomes 
problematic “industry interference” under the FCTC when the tobacco industry does it. 
 Although TID infuses the whole agreement, Article 5.3 of the FCTC perhaps best 
encapsulates the TID argument. Article 5.3 and the associated implementation guidelines commit 
signatory states to “act to protect [tobacco control policies] from commercial and other vested 
interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”38(para.3) This includes limiting state 
interactions with the tobacco industry, avoiding conflicts of interest for government officials and 
employees, and denormalizing activities described by the industry as “socially responsible,” such as 
philanthropic programs and sponsorship of the arts.38(para.17,p6) At the heart of these commitments is a 
key principle: that there exists a “fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco 
industry’s interests and public health policy interests.”38(para.13) 
 Article 5.3 of the FCTC states that parties to the agreement shall act to protect tobacco 
control policies “from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance 
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with international law.”39(art.5.3) Not only did the WHO member states choose to include this 
language, but they then drew up guidelines for how transparency in tobacco control policymaking 
should be implemented. 
 Unlike the FCTC itself, the guidelines are advisory. Nevertheless, they provide tobacco 
control advocates and whistle-blowers with significant ammunition in that they add specificity to the 
FCTC’s transparency commitments, enabling naming and shaming. The FCTC guidelines make explicit 
the “industry denormalization” strategy utilized by tobacco control advocates, stressing that there is 
a “fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and public 
health policy interests.”38(para.13) 
 The guidelines recommend that governments raise awareness “about tobacco industry 
interference,” such as the industry’s use of front groups to conceal their involvement in 
lobbying.38(para.18) Governments should “limit interactions with the tobacco industry and ensure the 
transparency of those interactions that occur.”38(para.17,p.2) Governments should reject “non-binding or 
non-enforceable” agreements with the industry, avoid “conflicts of interest for government officials 
and employees,” require the industry to provide “transparent and accurate” information, “impose 
mandatory penalties” for providing false or misleading information, and avoid giving the industry 
any preferential treatment such as tax exemption or subsidies. Finally, they should denormalize and, 
to the extent possible, regulate activities described as “socially responsible” by the tobacco industry, 
including but not limited to activities described as “corporate social responsibility.”38(para.17) 
 It is easy to think of reasons why the FCTC might not change domestic policy in the face of 
interest group, party, judicial, and other politics.40 But without looking for its independent effects on 
the policies of signatory states, we can see its effect on international law. There it is an instrument to 
bring TID into international trade and investment law and therefore a partial defense for tobacco 
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control policies that could otherwise be challenged as infringements on investors’ rights. The FCTC is 
both a testament to the unpopularity of the industry with governments and an instrument that 
extends TID into a world of international private law that was historically designed to privilege trade 
and firms. 
 In response, tobacco firms have fought hard to prevent equivalence between health and 
commercial principles in international law. Documents leaked from Philip Morris International to 
Reuters show that the firm conducted extensive lobbying around the 2014 meeting of the FCTC 
conference of parties, including meetings with government representatives designed to forge 
alliances and strengthen support for protrade positions. Company lobbyists fought against 
declarations that would have put health issues before trade and declared the FCTC as an 
international standard, and claimed victory in both fights.41 
 
TID in the Uruguay and Australia Investment Disputes 
Unlike other forms of economic law such as contract law, the core concepts and principles of 
international investment law are fluid and contested. Because the jurisdiction, and therefore the 
potential volume of law under consideration by an investment tribunal, is very broad (particularly 
when it comes to different national laws) because panel membership is ad hoc, because there are 
multiple and competing frameworks for investment law, and because precedent is handled 
differently by different panels, the tribune’s decisions vary greatly in their interpretation of key 
principles. This means that the tribunal has considerable discretion to frame the questions it will 
answer. 
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 The two cases involved Uruguay and Australia, both of which had enacted novel tobacco 
control policies that were world firsts. Uruguay’s unique “Single Presentation Requirement” (SPR) 
limited tobacco companies to sell only one variety of a brand (eg, Marlboro Red but not Marlboro 
Gold or Blue). Uruguay’s 80/80 rule required graphic health warnings, like repellant images depicting 
the consequences of smoking, to cover 80% of the front and back of cigarette packs, a much larger 
area than required by any other state. Australia’s “plain-packaging” policy built on this momentum 
to oblige companies to use standard packaging with an unattractive green-brown color palette and 
large graphic warnings and without distinctive brand logos or colors. 
 Despite losing domestic legal challenges in both states, tobacco firms made the decision to 
subject the measures in Uruguay and Australia to additional, extraterritorial legal challenges via 
international investment arbitration. In February 2010, Philip Morris International, the ultimate 
parent company of the Uruguayan tobacco firm Abal Hermanos, used its Swiss-based subsidiary 
Philip Morris Brands (PMB) to launch an investment dispute against Uruguay using an existing 
bilateral investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay, something the company had 
threatened to do many times but had never followed through.42 
 The same strategy was attempted in the Australian case. On November 21, 2011, the same 
day that the plain-packaging legislation received final passage through the Australian House of 
Representatives, PM International decided to initiate an investment dispute under UNCITRAL rules. 
Through its Hong Kong–based subsidiary, PM Asia, the company launched the dispute using the 
Australia–Hong Kong Bilateral Investment Agreement.43 Philip Morris Asia, headquartered in Hong 
Kong, wholly owns Philip Morris Australia, which wholly owns Philip Morris Limited. Hence, under 
the Asia–Hong Kong BIT, PMI hoped that PM Asia would be designated as a foreign investor with an 
interest in the Australian tobacco market. As Australian Federal Health Minister Nicola Roxon 
pointed out to ABC News, however, it was suspicious that PM Asia acquired a controlling interest in 
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PM Australia one year after the government announced its plain-packaging proposals. This implies 
that PM Asia’s acquisition was designed to facilitate the investment challenge.44 
 Ultimately, the Australia v PM Asia dispute lasted for four years. In December 2015, the 
tribunal in Australia v PM Asia dismissed the claims against Australia. The arbitrators unanimously 
determined that since PM Asia evidently acquired its interest in PM Australia after the plain-
packaging proposals were announced by the Australian government, they did not have a legitimate 
challenge under the Australia–Hong Kong BIT. The tribunal ruled that there was no need to 
investigate the claims further and dismissed the case.45 The award on costs was publicly released, 
but the final amount awarded was redacted from the document at the request of the 
parties.46(para.108) 
 Meanwhile, the PMB et al. v Uruguay dispute lasted for more than 6 years and cost the 
defendants US$28.5 million, including the costs of administering the dispute. In July 2016, the 
tribunal in PMB et al. v Uruguay dismissed the claims against Uruguay and awarded costs to the 
state. The tribunal decided that the claimants should pay US$7 million to Uruguay, plus all the fees 
and costs for the tribunal and the fees and costs incurred by ICSID.47(para.588) 
 
FCTC, BITs, and TID: Debating Tobacco Control in International Investment Law 
The Uruguay and Australia cases were efforts by tobacco companies to use international forums to 
resist domestic policies with strong TID components, and TID was part of the states’ responses in the 
tribunals. Translated into the issues and jargon of international investment law, the result was a 
focus on three issues: (1) the use of state authority to protect public health, particularly in regard to 
expropriation, or the taking of private property by government in order to serve a public purpose; 
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(2) the obligation of governments to accord investors “fair and equitable treatment” (and the related 
question of the whether or not investors should be held to the same standard); and (3) various 
aspects of the disputes in which the parties debated good governance. 
 
The Use of State Authority to Protect Public Health 
Is it legitimate to treat an entire, and legal, industry as different from the rest of the economy? In 
investment law, expropriation is the taking of private property by a government in order to serve 
some public purpose.28,48 The reasons why the concept of expropriation causes controversy are 
already evident from this basic definition. What constitutes taking? What is considered private 
property? What can and cannot be considered to be an action to further a public purpose? What 
evidence is necessary to demonstrate a public interest? Tribunals have come to their own, often 
disparate, conclusions. 
 Beyond these questions are broader, long-standing debates in the world of investment law 
that inform the tribunals’ reasoning. Can expropriation be indirect? In other words, is it 
expropriation if the private property in question is taken incrementally, over a period of time, as a 
result of regulatory change? For many years, firms have attempted to frame incremental regulatory 
change as “indirect expropriation,” whereas many legal commentators have attacked the idea as an 
unwelcome stretching of the core concept. Looking at the question from another angle, is it 
expropriation if “ownership” of the property did not pass to the government but the value of the 
property decreased as a result of government policies? Under which circumstances, whether or not 
a determination of expropriation is made, should an investor be compensated for government 
actions? Debates over the meaning of expropriation in investment law literally consist of claims for 
and against public power to regulate the private sector. 
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 Although the full case against Australia was not heard, in initiating the challenge PM Asia 
argued that plain-packaging legislation constituted an indirect form of expropriation, and it 
requested a compensation payment.43 This is an old threat, repeated by tobacco firms in many other 
circumstances. In 1994, RJ Reynolds alleged that proposed plain-packaging legislation would violate 
Canada’s obligations under NAFTA, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the TRIPS 
Agreement, and the Paris Convention and that it would constitute “unlawful expropriation” 
requiring “hundreds of millions of dollars of compensation.49 
 In the Uruguay case, this argument was fully tested for the first time. The claimants argued 
that a partial deprivation of the economic benefit of their investments—in other words, a loss in the 
value of their assets, their trademarks—would be enough to uphold a claim of indirect 
expropriation. They also argued that the state should have to provide adequate compensation in the 
event of “lawful expropriation” even when the policies in question served a public purpose. 
 In response, Uruguay argued that “interference with foreign property” in the course of a 
valid exercise of the state’s police power does not constitute expropriation. The respondents stated 
that indirect expropriation would occur only if the measures had had such a severe impact that the 
claimants’ business became virtually worthless, arguing that “if States were held liable for 
expropriation every time a regulation had an adverse impact, effective governance would be 
rendered impossible.” 
 The tribunal in the Uruguay case accepted many of the state’s arguments. The tribunal ruled 
that because the ownership of the tobacco firms’ intellectual property did not change, this was a 
matter of indirect expropriation, but it noted that indirect expropriation under the specific BIT in 
question was defined more strictly than in other BITs. For there to be indirect expropriation, the 
tribunal reasoned, there would have to be “substantial deprivation” of the value, use, or enjoyment 
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of the investments as a result of the government’s actions. The panel pointed out that no absolute 
right to use a trademark exists and that consequently there must be an expectation of some 
regulation. The tribunal ruled that there was no evidence that the 80/80 regulation was indirect 
expropriation, as the brand and other elements continued to appear on the cigarette packs. 
Likewise, the “effects of the SPR were far from depriving Abal of the value of its business,”47(para.284) 
as Abal had become more profitable since 2011, even though that it would have been even more 
profitable if the measures had not been implemented. 
 While stating that this was enough evidence to reject the claim, the tribunal chose to offer 
additional commentary about the use of the state’s police powers and the definition of indirect 
expropriation.47(para.287) In effect, the tribunal asked a broad and significant question: Were the 
policies in question valid uses of the state’s police powers to protect public health? In its response, 
the tribunal stated that adopting the measures “was a valid exercise of the State’s police 
powers,”47(para.287) and that as “evidence of the evolution of the principles in the field, the police 
powers doctrine has found confirmation in recent trade and investment treaties.”47(para.300) They 
noted that several modern model BITs explain that nondiscriminatory regulations with “legitimate 
public welfare objectives” such as public health do not constitute indirect expropriation.47(para.300) In 
choosing to provide commentary on the police powers question and in referencing multiple prior 
investment decisions in detail, the panel showed a clear intent to link this decision with modern 
thinking on key investment principles in order to promote a good image of the international trade 
and investment system. 
 
“Fair and Equitable Treatment” Versus “Abuse of Rights” 
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TID means labeling an entire industry, rather than its products or individual companies, as abnormal 
and problematic. This cuts against some of the core principles of international trade law, which 
generally do not discriminate among industries. Many international investment agreements obligate 
the signatory state to accord investors “fair and equitable treatment” (FET). Yet defining FET is 
difficult. The texts of the BITs and tribunals themselves tend to handle this issue very differently, 
resulting in a very broad concept that frequently favors investors over governments. Governments 
have to prove that they have provided FET, but investors have no equivalent obligation to prove that 
they have acted fairly. Across all investor-state disputes, in order to accord FET a state would have to 
act “consistently, transparently, reasonably, without ambiguity, arbitrariness or discrimination, in an 
even-handed manner, to ensure due process in decision-making and respect investors’ ‘legitimate 
expectations,’” something that would be hard for the best-resourced and well-governed countries 
but even harder for developing or recently democratized states.28(p.xiii) 
 How badly does a state have to fall short of this ideal to violate its investment promises? 
Does FET include the right to a stable or even static legal environment? Like expropriation, FET gives 
rise to many questions but does not point to clear answers. Tribunals cannot even agree on whether 
FET should be defined by reference to the specific circumstances of the treaty in question or placed 
in the context of minimum standards in international law more broadly. 
 One point of consensus, however, is that BITs do not constrain firm behavior to nearly the 
extent to which they constrain government behavior. Both the Uruguay and Australia cases had an 
interesting denormalization twist regarding whether or not firms can or should also be expected to 
behave fairly and in good faith, with varying results. 
 In the Uruguay case, Uruguay’s representatives argued that the claim against the FET 
standard should be dismissed because the claimants had a history of deception. The respondents 
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alleged that when misleading labels were banned, the company moved to color coding to convey the 
same misleading message as before. Uruguay’s SPR requirement and the 80/80 regulation were 
therefore “direct outgrowths of the Claimants’ history of deceit,” a response to an attempt by 
tobacco companies to skirt the previous regulation. On the basis of ex dolo malo non oritur actio 
(“an action at law does not rise from evil deceit”) and the related “unclean hands doctrine” in 
common law, Uruguay argued that an investor should not be able to claim that it has not been 
accorded FET when it has not itself acted in good faith.47(para.348) 
 For its part, the tribunal acknowledged in its statement that decisions by the United States’ 
District of Columbia Circuit Court and US Court of Appeals “authoritatively show that the Claimants 
have engaged in a history of misconduct and consumer deceit,” including denying that smoking is 
harmful, denying that nicotine is addictive, and creating extended brand families “to promote the 
false belief among health-concerned consumers that some cigarettes are less harmful than 
others.”47(para.386) 
 Despite hearing this argument, however, the tribunal ducked the issue of industry 
misconduct, which would have been more novel in this legal context, choosing to focus instead on 
areas where the government would have to bear the burden of proof: the rationale behind the 
policies and the ways in which they were adopted. The tribunal concluded (by a majority) that 
although the SPR was not specifically the subject of detailed research, the rationale behind the 
policy was supported by public health evidence. In making this decision, it drew heavily on the 
amicus brief submitted by the WHO. Furthermore, it concluded that the measure was a reasonable 
one when adopted, “not an arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust, discriminatory or a disproportionate 
measure.”47(para.420) The tribunal confirmed that the BIT did not prevent governments from adopting 
novel measures, providing that they have a rational basis and are not discriminatory.47(para.430) Gary 
Born, the arbitrator for the claimants (Phillip Morris), wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which 
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he was very cautious to state that he was not challenging the state’s right to regulate to protect 
public health but that he nevertheless objected to arguments on fair and equitable treatment and 
the denial of justice claims.50 
 The tribunal relied heavily in its reasoning on precedent from recent investment tribunals. 
Specifically, the panel stated that investors’ right not to have their “legitimate expectations” broken 
or their right to a legally stable environment does not mean that the state cannot exercise its 
sovereign authority to legislate or change its laws.47(para.295-299) Given the direction of international law 
(eg, the FCTC), in fact, the investors should have expected progressively more stringent regulation. 
 Likewise in the Australia case, PM Asia expected to argue that plain packaging does not 
constitute ”fair and equitable treatment,” relying on the claim that Australia had violated the 
“legitimate expectations” of investors.43 Before they could do this, however, their claims were 
dismissed on the grounds that the claimants had abused their right to sue under the treaty. 
 Much of the Australian case centers around the timing of relevant events, specifically PMI’s 
corporate restructuring. As Uruguay did in its dispute, Australia alleged that the tobacco industry’s 
behavior was not in keeping with the intended purpose of the investment agreement. Australia’s 
representatives argued that the claimants had abused their rights to bring a challenge under the BIT 
because they had acquired their controlling stake in PM Australia after the Australian government 
announced that it would pursue plain packaging. 
 The importance of timing is illustrated in the documents examined by the tribunal, which 
include extensively detailed timelines submitted by both parties. A large portion of the tribunal’s 
decision is, in fact, an exhaustive process-tracing exercise. After reviewing the evidence, the tribunal 
noted that the claimants had made statements to the effect that their rights would be harmed by 
plain packaging as early as 2009 but that they did not acquire their stake in PM Australia until much 
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later, after the formal policy announcement had been made in 2010. Furthermore, the claimants 
had failed to provide internal documents or witnesses that could sufficiently establish that they had 
any economic motivation for the restructuring.45(para.582) For those reasons, the tribunal ultimately 
upheld Australia’s claim that an “abuse of rights” had taken place. 
 
The Importance of Good Governance 
These cases seem to show that TID works only if the government doing it is perceived as “normal,” 
competent, and not aberrant. The states in this litigation were all of these things, but the companies 
attempted to discredit their governance in the course of the cases. Countries need to be thought by 
tribunals to have good governance if they are to successfully single out a legal industry for special 
negative treatment. They also need good governance in the sense of a stable and predictable 
legislative process that can anticipate and prepare for legal challenge. 
 Uruguay is a high-income country with a highly functional democracy, and Australia is one of 
the most prosperous and stable countries in the world. In generalizing from these cases to other 
potential challenges, therefore, it is important to note that many other countries would find it more 
difficult to defend an investment decision. Yet the tribunal found problems with the governance 
process in both states, despite the eventual dismissal of the claims against them. This is one of the 
reasons that investment arbitration can be so pernicious, that even the best governance procedures, 
in the most stable regulatory environments, can produce mistakes, oversights, and even corruption. 
 In the Uruguay case, the state was forced to prove that it had followed due process in 
formulating, passing, and implementing the single presentation requirement (SPR) and the “80/80 
regulation” requiring historically large graphic health warnings on cigarette packs. Despite its 
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eventual dismissal of the case, the tribunal’s remarks in several places are critical of Uruguay’s 
governance. The tribunal described the 80/80 regulation as “in the nature of a bright idea” rather 
than a carefully deliberated policy, and it notes that the paper trail demonstrating the process of 
formulating and passing the policy was inadequate.47(para.85) 
 But a majority of the tribunal pointed out that “the present case concerns a legislative policy 
decision taken against the background of a strong scientific consensus as to the lethal effects of 
tobacco.” “Substantial deference” should therefore be due to governments attempting to deal with 
an “acknowledged and major public health problem.” Furthermore, “the fair and equitable 
treatment standard is not a justiciable standard of good government, and the tribunal is not a court 
of appeal.”47(para.418) 
 The tribunal also reviewed domestic litigation. The claimants challenged the process of 
judicial review covering the proposed measures, alleging a denial of justice. Because Uruguay’s 
procedural court and its supreme court have different jurisdictions, Abal Hermanos was able to 
challenge the 80/80 rule twice, once in each court. The courts came to different conclusions. The 
claimants alleged that there was a denial of justice in this case on the grounds that the courts’ 
decisions were divergent and that the procedural court’s decision referenced British American 
Tobacco (BAT) several times, even though BAT participated in a separate dispute. 
 The majority of the tribunal considered denial of justice to be a serious allegation requiring 
an “elevated standard of proof,” essentially an allegation against the state’s entire judicial system. 
The tribunal noted that panels “should not act as courts of appeal to find a denial of justice, still less 
as bodies charged with improving the judicial architecture of the State.”47(para.528) The majority of 
arbitrators considered that the failure to deliver a separate judgment for Abal was a matter of 
procedural propriety and therefore not something that escalated to the level of denial of justice or, 
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as the claimants put it, an “Orwellian display of arbitrariness.”47(para.521) It is important to note that 
the arbitrator for the claimants disagreed on both the issues regarding FET and those specific to the 
denial of justice claim.50 
 In the Australia case, much of the deliberation revolved around competing allegations of 
misconduct. Australia alleged that the tobacco companies’ Foreign Investment Application, which 
must be completed before a foreign investor can acquire an investment in Australia, was false or 
misleading in that the firm did not discuss its intent to initiate ISDS using the Hong Kong–Australia 
BIT. The firms countered that Australia accepted the application by providing a “no objections” letter 
and did not seek to correct this at a later date. The tribunal agreed with the claimants, noting that 
there appeared to have been an oversight by the Australian officials, given their later allegations of 
firm misconduct. This shows how even the best-prepared and best-resourced government can take a 
misstep in investment arbitration proceedings. 
 
 
Discussion 
Taken together, the seminal cases analyzed here show that while TID arguments played an 
important role, they are, taken alone, not enough to win. In particular, these cases raise three 
important issues: the impact of codified political commitments to tobacco control, the importance of 
leveraging an extensive body of evidence (including evidence of industry practices), and the need for 
governments to demonstrate “good governance.” 
 In the two cases, the effects of the tobacco control advocates’ denormalization strategies 
can be clearly seen. The FCTC played a starring role in both, enabling advocates to argue that the 
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states were acting in line with their international legal obligations. Notably, the text of the Australian 
act specifically states that one of the objects of the law is to “give effect to certain obligations that 
Australia has as a party to the Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC].”51(para.3) Despite both cases 
involving novel policies, the FCTC and the political and scientific consensus that advocates have built 
around it lessened the burden of proof for states. 
 The Uruguay case, for example, contains several disagreements about the public health 
evidence behind the proposed measures. The parties disagreed about trends in smoking prevalence 
and the relationship of those trends to the measures in question, as well as about whether or not 
the policies boosted demand for illicit tobacco products. Nevertheless, the tribunal pointed to the 
amicus curiae briefs submitted by the WHO, FCTC, and PAHO arguing that there was a clear evidence 
base for SPR and large graphic labels. Despite ducking the issue regarding whether the industry had 
“unclean hands,” the tribunal explicitly noted that the policies were supported by the FCTC and its 
associated guidelines, which are “evidence-based.” 
 But in neither case were denormalization strategies—reliance on the FCTC and presentation 
of evidence of individual firms’ misconduct—enough to win an investment dispute. Good 
governance in two senses is another essential prerequisite. First, governments were required to 
demonstrate that they formulated, decided on, and implemented the policy according to due 
process as understood by international economic tribunals. The key concepts in question—the “fair 
and equitable treatment” (FET) by states, and the “good faith” and “abuse of rights” by firms—do 
not receive equal attention in investment law. FET is something that governments promise to 
provide to investors. As a concept, it has stretched and stretched over time as tribunals have 
overreached their initial intended purpose and now can cover everything from the intent of the 
policy, the procedure by which it was passed and implemented, the evidence supporting it, and the 
provision of avenues of legal redress to foreign investors. Companies’ obligations to show good faith 
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and not to abuse the process (as, for example, Australia suggested that Phillip Morris did) are 
weaker and ill-defined and result in no sanctions, save the risk of losing a case they might bring. 
 In addition to having “good governance” in the eyes of international trade lawyers and 
tribunals, the cases show the need for good governance in a second sense, that of a highly 
competent bureaucracy that can pilot a policy through the shoals of trade and investment rules. 
Policymakers adopting tobacco control policies need to be fully aware of the industry’s likely tactics 
and arguments, strongly committed to countering them, and fully prepared for long, contentious, 
and expensive legal battles. Even governments with the best resources require extensive legal and 
technical assistance from international experts to defend against such challenges.52,53 In low- and 
middle-income countries, these needs can be more extensive. Considerable government 
commitment and civil society mobilization are required to overcome the industry’s pressure.54,55 
 The cases also hinged on the extent to which the tribunal showed deference toward the 
state’s right to regulate. Arbitrators are aware that they govern disputes through the mutual consent 
and goodwill of governments and investors, and governments have been getting cold feet about 
ISDS in recent years.56 Behind this shift seems to be the realization by states that many of the older 
investment treaties signed in the 1980s and 1990s were hugely deferential to private investors. 
There is currently a push to correct this in many modern trade and investment agreements, although 
this will not fix many of the older, more ambiguous BITs.57,58(annex 8-A), 47(para. 300) 
 Investor-state provisions are not going away any time soon and are, in fact, contained in 
newer and proposed trade agreements (such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between the European Union and Canada, the Trans Pacific Partnership, and the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership). The number of investor-state dispute cases per year is trending 
upward, now a total of more than 600 globally.59 It is an open question, however, whether the 
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importance of “deference to states” is particularly high in this case vis-à-vis other cases of its type. 
Both Australia and Uruguay are high-visibility cases that garnered a relatively large amount of public 
attention. The consequences of a loss for either state would have been very severe and have had 
strong political ramifications. The tribunals seemed to have been aware of this. Whether out of self-
interest as agents of the international investment arbitration system or as opportunists looking to 
shape the system through this case, they emphasized the potential impact of the dispute on public 
policy. 
 One solution that some tobacco control advocates have pushed for is perhaps the ultimate 
expression of TID strategies in law: “carving out” tobacco control measures from trade and 
investment agreements and thus preventing any ISDS challenge.60,61 Many trade agreements contain 
general exceptions designed to allow states to take measures to protect human health, even if they 
restrict the flow of goods. But some tobacco control advocates and legal experts argue that these 
exceptions offer inadequate protection to public health measures and support more specific ways of 
excluding tobacco policies from trade and investment agreements. The Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP, now reformulated as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership) was the first agreement to contain such a measure. Moreover, the idea of a tobacco 
“carve-out” may be spreading, with the recent Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement and the 
Canadian Free Trade Agreement (governing internal trade among Canadian provinces) containing 
similar measures. 
 Carve-outs are not without controversy. Tobacco firms view them as unfair and arbitrary. 
Business organizations have argued that carving out tobacco products sets an uncomfortable 
precedent for carving out more products or sectors in the future. And some trade experts have 
expressed concerns that the differential treatment of tobacco firms undermines the global trade and 
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investment system. But for public health advocates, they could be a superior strategy against the 
risks of ISDS outlined by these cases. 
 
Conclusions 
TID is a major strategy for tobacco control advocates. Portraying the industry as abnormal matters a 
great deal to tobacco control advocates seeking to influence policy and the political process. 
Negative opinions of the industry can also improve smokers’ intent to quit or prevent initiation. TID 
is therefore both an effective political and legal strategy and a tool for promoting public health. 
 As the preceding analysis shows, TID also has weaknesses in the context of legal arbitration 
that tobacco control advocates and policymakers need to understand. TID arguments rely on 
establishing unequal treatment, denormalizing a single industry, whereas arbitration is supposed to 
do the opposite. TID is threatened by trade and investment law because such law does not 
distinguish among kinds of firms, affording tobacco companies the same protections as any other 
investor has. Trade and investment disputes like those reviewed in this article are thus a way for 
firms to tip the balance back toward private industry by moving outside national regulatory 
frameworks. 
 In these cases, this meant that arguments for greater scrutiny of industry misconduct were 
balanced against an examination of the state’s policymaking process and evidence base for action. 
On the one hand, these decisions were groundbreaking in that the arbitrators acknowledged the 
importance of the international consensus in favor of tobacco control policies as codified in the 
FCTC. On the other hand, arbitrators largely sidestepped questions of industry misconduct and 
closely examined government actions in implementing the policies in question. 
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 Thus, governments seeking to invoke TID in international trade or investment disputes must 
also examine their own past behavior with an eye to justifying it before international tribunals. Many 
governments have passed stringent tobacco labeling laws, but not all governments are capable of 
defending themselves against extraterritorial arbitration, even with assistance and funding from the 
international tobacco control community. Governments have an incentive to invest not just in 
overall good governance as seen by trade tribunals (which they might find politically unfeasible or 
objectionable) but also in the capacity of policy to determine what kinds of challenges they might 
face. 
 Success in these cases does not guarantee success in the cases to come. That is the 
drawback of denormalization: the successful denormalization of tobacco and the tobacco industry 
has been enabled by tight circumscription of the target (“a product like no other”). Can advocates 
extend TID strategies to new products from the same industry, such as e-cigarettes, or different 
products and industries altogether, such as sugary beverages? When it comes to e-cigarettes, the 
international tobacco control community is divided over whether to recommend “precautionary” 
approaches such as banning the sale of e-cigarettes versus “harm reduction” approaches that 
support the wider availability of e-cigarettes. It is not too far-fetched to imagine that future 
arbitration against e-cigarette regulation might be more difficult for tobacco control advocates to 
fight and that TID strategies could be less helpful, or even a complicating factor, in these cases. 
 This analysis shows the importance of codifying key TID principles in law. The legal reasoning 
of the tribunals gives great weight to law and distrusts government discretion, so if governments 
signal a commitment clearly through legislation and international legal instruments, tribunals are 
likely to accept the legitimacy of actions implementing that commitment. Advocates, no matter how 
heavily invested in TID, might consider that a broader Framework Convention on Public Heath, as 
proposed by Lawrence Gostin, could open up space for the future regulation of (and potential 
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denormalization of) industries like processed foods.62 That would be ironic, given that TID explicitly 
separates out tobacco from other industries with which public health advocates might have 
conflicts.63 
 The complex, opaque international trade and investment law system, which has no record of 
TID, looks like favorable terrain for tobacco firms. Nonetheless, these cases show how TID can and 
should be extended to the international arena and how international agreements like the FCTC can 
change the balance of international law toward public health. If governments and tobacco control 
advocates invest in governance compliant with international legal expectations, evidence for their 
actions, and international and domestic statements of commitment to public health, they can 
promote public health policies even in the seemingly hostile environment of international trade and 
investment law. 
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